INTRODUCTION 2 METHODOLOGY OF WORK
A rational database of Aframax tankers was set up in 2.1 Hazard identification and ranking the framework of the EU-funded project entitled
The first step of a risk assessment methodology is 'pollution, prevention and control' (POP&C) to enable to carry out a hazard identification and ranking the full exploitation of the raw incident data compiled (HAZID) study. In order to perform the HAZID study and which was commercially available by Lloyd's efficiently, the safety matter under consideration Maritime Information Service (LMIS). The textual and scope of the study need to be clearly defined. information presented in the incident data were
The scope could be limited to a certain ship type, or reanalysed by a team of the POP&C project partners size, specific accident scenarios, specific operational and were introduced in the newly developed database conditions, typical design and operation concepts, to produce appropriate accident statistics.
etc. In the context of the POP&C project, the main The analysis was focused on six major accident purpose was the identification of main hazards that categories, namely non-accidental structural failure, lead to a vessel's loss of watertight integrity (LOWI) collision, contact, grounding, fire, and explosion. and consequently cause pollution and environmental Whilst, on one hand, the analysis made an attempt to damage. Such a HAZID study can conveniently be identify basic events leading to these major casualty carried out by analysing the incident and accident categories, on the other hand, factors related to performance of a representative sector of the industry. consequences such as the degree of severity of Therefore, in order to demonstrate the methodology accidents, oil spill occurrence, and impact of hull which is being developed, the POP&C project selected design were also investigated.
to analyse the Aframax class of tankers. Reasons for this selection were the relatively large market segment of the Aframax tankers, past spectacular Aframax tankers which are currently operational and can be estimated. Quantitative information can be obtained by evaluating the frequencies of the minimal expected to continue to operate until they reach the recently amended (accelerated) phase-out date [1] . cut sets, therefore obtaining the frequency of the top event. Relevant data may be extracted from Although the scope of the POP&C project is limited to tanker vessels of Aframax size and to accident databases on accidents and incidents or, if data are not available, expert judgement may be used. scenarios that will lead to vessel's LOWI, which consequently causes pollution and environmental An event tree graphically models the possible outcomes of an initiating event capable of producing damage, the risks are not limited to environmental risk, but risks to human life and property are also an end event of interest (usually undesirable, such as an accident). It provides a systematic means considered within the study.
Assessment of hazards can conveniently be made of delineating accident sequences in terms of the event successes and failures that make up those by gathering data in the following three steps:
sequences. Event tree analysis can provide qualitative (a) basic information;
descriptions of potential problems (combinations (b) hazard identification; of events producing various types of problem from (c) ranking.
initiating events) and quantitative estimates of event frequencies or probabilities of each outcome which Basic information will include the scope of the study, the objectives, and background information still provide useful information in demonstrating the relative importance of various failure sequences. on the system to be analysed (system, function, and operation). In the hazard identification process, An event tree starts with one initiating event (in this case these are main accident categories using several structured analysis methods, as many hazards as possible are identified. It makes use of the of collision, grounding, contact, non-accidental structural failure, fire, and explosions) and terminates experience of the experts employed as well as of the accident and incident data collected prior to the in multiple end states, considering all possible outcomes (such as total loss of ship due to loss of study. Each hazard identified is coarsely analysed in terms of possible causes for its occurrence, its stability, ship breaks into pieces, and ship stays afloat with various degrees of damage) by taking into possible effects, and foreseen safeguards to prevent the hazard and/or possible scenarios developing consideration both the success and the failure of foreseen safeguards and measures to prevent the from it, or to mitigate the effects and consequences. In the ranking process, each scenario is assessed development of subsequent events or to mitigate their magnitude. By estimating the probability that regarding the likelihood or frequency of its occurrence and regarding the severity of its possible effects and a specific safeguard and measure is successful or not, the probability of each of the possible outcomes consequences.
Several mainstream techniques (what-if analysis, from the initiating event can be calculated. However, even if not quantified, the event tree provides signi-what-if and checklist analysis, hazard and operability analysis, failure modes and effects analysis, fault tree ficant insights by providing information on the best possible locations where certain risk control options analysis, event tree analysis, and human hazard identification) are used for HAZID in the maritime or pollution control options can be employed in order to prevent the escalation of sequence of events world. These methods were reviewed and a method utilizing fault tree and event tree techniques was from becoming more critical (e.g. a small fire leading to a large-scale explosion or a fatigue cracking causing selected to be used in the project.
Fault tree analysis provides a disciplined rigorous the ship to break into pieces because of loss of structural strength). approach to the identification and quantification of system failures. The objective of a fault tree analysis is to identify the potential combination of events that 2.2 Development of fault trees and event trees can make a system fail to perform its function. Fault trees provide qualitative and quantitative information.
The main incident categories aligned with the objectives of the POP&C were identified as collision, In terms of qualitative information, even in case of missing data, a fault tree analysis can provide contact, grounding, non-accidental structural failure, fire, and explosion, and the POP&C risk model was significant insights regarding the causes leading to the top event. By studying the logical interactions developed.
A fault tree and an event tree for each of the of the individual basic (root cause) events in a fault tree, the importance of each basic event in relation six main accident categories were developed by the POP&C partners. The fault trees developed for to its contribution to the occurrence of the top event the collision and grounding accident categories are (b) type of incident or accident according to LMIS coding, namely 'hull and machinery', 'collision', shown in the Appendix (Figs 12 and 13 respectively). Similarly, event trees developed for the collision and 'grounding', 'fire or explosion ' and 'miscellaneous'; (c) year and location (Marsden grid) of the occurrence grounding accident categories are presented in the Appendix (Figs 14 and 15 respectively). of accidents; (d) degree of severity of each incident or accident, As stated previously, although unpopulated (without frequencies) POP&C risk contribution fault trees and according to LMIS coding; (e) basic information concerning environmental event trees of the identified six accident categories which can potentially lead to LOWI of a tanker's pollution (quantity and units); (f) Number of killed and missing persons and the hull provide qualitative information that can still be useful, quantitative assessment can only be made if case of Dead ship condition; also complementary texts with a raw description of the incident these are populated by a comprehensive analysis of past accident data and/or use of expert judgement.
or accident concerning the causes, the ship's operating condition at the time of incident or For this reason, a rational database of Aframax tankers was set up to enable the full exploitation of the raw accident, the location, environmental pollution, and the outcome concerning the resulting ship's incident and accident data that were commercially available from LMIS. Much of the incident and condition. accident information contained in the LMIS database is in textual format and it is consequently difficult to 2.4 POP&C database extract and analyse this information systematically. Therefore, the textual information presented in the The initial selected records were imported into a LMIS database had to be reanalysed by a team of database in order to enable a comprehensive analysis POP&C project partners before it could be introduced of the data to be made. The POP&C Tanker Casualty into the newly developed database.
Database has been set up in Microsoft Access format and can run on any personal computer employing
Source of data
Microscoft Office 2000 (or later versions). The database was further developed in order to register the The basic information was a comprehensive set of information of the complementary texts in a proper incident and accident records which was originally manner (using checklists, pull-down menus, etc.) so obtained mostly from LMIS and updated by INTERthat the information could be easily retrieved and TANKO for later years, concerning all subtypes and systematically analysed. The registered information sizes of tankers and covering the period from 1978 was constructed such that the POP&C risk conto early 2004. tribution fault trees and event trees developed by The selection of the particular tanker ship size, the project could be populated partially or comnamely Aframax, was based on dead weight tonnage pletely. Synoptically, the following considerations (DWT) size segment 80 000-119 999. In addition to the were included in the new version. size, the basic Aframax subtypes were also selected, namely oil tankers, crude tankers, shuttle tankers, 1. New major categories of incidents and accidents product carriers, and tankers that can transport were predefined, namely non-accidental structural either chemicals or oil. On the other hand, vessels failure, collision, contact, grounding, fire, explosion, that can transport, ore, bulk goods, or oil, and failure of hull fittings, machinery failure, and chemical tankers were excluded from the analysis unknown reasons. since these tanker subtypes have special design 2. Each incident and accident category was further features and layout, which are not representative described by subcategories and/or descriptions of the whole Aframax class of tankers. Of all the of causes and exact ship's location. Basically, the available records, 1294 accident records were finally following considerations were defined in order to extracted to be further analysed with respect to size follow the POP&C risk contribution fault trees: and particular tanker subtypes covering the period (a) non-accidental structural failure occurrence from 1978 to early 2004 [2] . due to 'structural degradation', due to 'poor The existing information of the initial records design or construction' or due to 'excessive covered the following: loading'; (b) collision occurrence (ship to ship) because (a) ship's basic characteristics (Lloyd's Register-International Maritime Organization (IMO), ship of 'failure to supervise route' or 'failure of avoidance manoeuvring'; name, ship type, built year and DWT); (c) contact: 'contact with floating object' or 2.6 Critical review of casualty databases 'contact with fixed installation';
The POP&C incident and accident categorisation (d) grounding: 'drift grounding' or 'powered represents significant deviations from the categorigrounding'; zation adopted in the LMIS database [4] , which to a (e) fire as initiating event due to 'internal source', large extent has become an industry standard over the 'external source' (piracy or spread of fire years. For example, 'Fire and explosions' are treated from another ship) or due to 'atmospheric as one category in LMIS and in other data sources. conditions' (lightning) together with further Upon examining the causes and consequences of fire description on the ship's main location and and of explosion accidents, it was realized that these ignition source;
differ considerably and, because the scope of the (f) explosion as initiating event in the cargo or analysis is to use this information on risk-based slop tanks, in the aft area, on deck or in the methodologies, it was considered essential to define ballast tanks or void spaces, together with accurately the first initiating event. Therefore, fire ignition source information. and explosion events were investigated separately.
Enhanced oil spill information concerning the
The LMIS database has also a category called location, proximity to shore, total oil spill quantity, 'hull and machinery', which incorporates structural and the amount recovered was recorded.
failures, failures of machinery and propulsion 4. Information on fatalities and injuries, namely the devices, and failures of hull and deck fittings, all numbers of serious injuries, non-serious injuries, of which should be rationally examined under fatalities and missing persons, was registered.
separate categories as they are associated with 5. Event location and ship's operating condition were different fault and event trees. In the POP&C defined according to IMO relevant descriptions [3] .
database, the corresponding 'hull and machinery' Basic information on the environmental condition incidents and accidents were analysed under one at the time of the incident or accident was noted. accident category, namely non-accidental structural 6. Outcome of the incident or accident with respect failure (potentially a LOWI occurrence; see below) to the ship's condition after the event such as and two incident categories, namely failure of hull 'remains afloat', 'total loss', 'sailed by her means' fittings (a non-LOWI occurrence), and machinery or 'towed away', 'LOWI', 'minor repairs' or 'major failure (a non-LOWI occurrence). repairs', 'sold for demolition ', 'broken up', 'no In addition, contact accidents (collision between a damage reported or sustained' were documented.
tanker and a fixed installation or a floating object) 7. Finally, information regarding the ship's hull type were separated from collision accidents because (single hull (SH), double hull (DH), double bottom they differ as an accident mechanism from ship-to-(DB), and double side (DS)) involved in the ship collisions. Furthermore, as implied earlier, each incident or accident was provided by Lloyd's major accident category was subdivided by a unique Register and was input to the database.
sequence of subcategories and complemented by 2.5 Population of POP&C database descriptions of causes and consequences, all of which follows the POP&C risk contribution fault trees The process of populating the POP&C database was and event trees developed by the project. carried out by the present authors. Each partner For the purpose of the POP&C analysis, accidents organization undertook the task of studying the are classified according to the six LOWI categories. accompanying complementary textual information This categorization is carried out in accordance with for each incident or accident record and entering the the resulting event, such that, for example, failure of relevant information in the format specified above.
steering equipment resulting in grounding is classified Because of the fuzzy character of the majority of the as a grounding event. Furthermore, failure of steering available information of the records and also for equipment which does not lead to one of the six ensuring the non-biased assessment of the incident accident categories is assigned to an incident category records to the extent feasible, a second round review outside the six LOWI categories, as also are cases of all records was conducted, by exchanging the of failures of hull and deck fittings which do not records between the analysts. It should be noted lead to LOWI (all these are also termed here as that, when the raw record data were poor, requiring 'incidents'). the personal judgement of the analysts for proper Event location, oil spill location, and ship's population of the database, a slightly different operating conditions at the time of the incident or degree of 'strictness' was observed in relation to the assumptions made.
accident are properly described according to IMO The percentage of serious and catastrophic conforce) and description of the outcome of the incident sequences (serious and total losses) are almost similar, or accident with respect to the vessel's condition, concerning the navigational accidents (collisions, such as no sustained damage, sustained damage contacts, and groundings) and the non-accidental requiring minor or major repairs, and total loss, are structural failures. also recorded in the database.
Explosion accidents present very high percentage of severe consequences (32 per cent serious and 22 per cent total losses) and, if it happens, the particular 3 REVIEW OF RESULTS accident category is characterized as the most severe event in terms of consequences, with fire accidents 3.1 Degree of severity to be the second most severe events. The consequences of accidents were analysed in Interestingly, explosion is the least frequent accident relation to the degree of severity levels: 'total loss', category, while fire is the second least frequent. Furthermore, the frequency of explosion accidents 'serious', and 'non-serious' as defined in the LMIS with severe consequences (see serious degree and total losses) varies at the same levels as with the other accident categories ( Fig. 1(b) ). Grounding accidents present the highest frequency of accidents with severe consequences.
Frequencies of accidents
In Fig. 2 , the overall accident rate per ship year of all the six accident categories is presented, as well as the rate per accident category. It is evident that the frequency of occurrence of Aframax accidents has been greatly reduced in recent years. A series of IMO regulations concerning the prevention of incidents and accidents have apparently contributed to these improvements. A separate study was conducted [5] concerning the influence of regulations on the safety record of Aframax tankers. According to the study, a number of key regulations appear to have contributed to the declining trends of accident rates.
It is worthwhile to state that the reduction in the frequency of accidents has not been accompanied by an equivalent reduction in their environmental pollution consequences [6], as indicated in Fig. 3. 
Spilled tonne rates
Spilled tonne rates are defined as the rate of the quantity of oil spilled to the corresponding fleet at risk. In Fig. 4 , the annual spilled tonne rates of the six studied accident categories are presented. The rate is slightly increased in the post-1990 period, as indicated by the corresponding average values (horizontal lines in the figure), meaning that the environmental pollution per ship year is increased as well. According to the historical data, this increase is due to the navigational accidents ( Fig. 5) and to non-accidental structural failures (Fig. 6 ). Fire accidents have almost negligible spilled tonne rates throughout the studied period, whereas explosions produced almost zero values in the post-1990 period.
Impact of hull design
An extensive study about the tankers' hull type and resulted oil spills has been presented in reference [7] . An interesting example of a comparison between tanker hull configurations is the comparison of the performance of the pre-MARPOL single-hull tankers with no segregated ballast tanks protectively located (SH-non-SBT/PL tankers) to the performance of the Interestingly, when the data for the 26 year period of the analysis is split into two (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) found that the performances of the SH-SBT/PL tankers are seen to be far superior to those of the and 1991-2003) the superiority of the SH-SBT/PL tankers over the SH-non-SBT/PL tankers dramatically SH-non-SBT/PL tankers (Table 1) [7] . Fig. 4 Aframax spilled tonne rates of accidents that potentially lead to LOWI Fig. 5 Aframax spilled tonne rates of navigational accidents increases in the later period and this increase is made up from an improvement in the performance of the SH-SBT/PL tankers (which is comparable with the double-hull fleet) and from a deterioration in the performance of the SH-non-SBT/PL tankers, which in the second period has experienced accelerated ageing. Figure 7 (a) presents the accident rates for all hull configurations by accident category and by age groups (of 5 year periods). Figure 7 (b) presents the same information but this time for accidents with a serious degree of severity, including accidents which led to total losses of ships. As far as the navigational accidents are concerned, namely collisions, contacts, and groundings, there is no clear and consistent trend between accident rates and age. On the other hand, non-accidental structural failures and, to a smaller extent, fires and explosions appear to be showing a 'bell-shaped' behaviour whereby there is higher frequency of accidents during the 'middle age' of the ships' lives.
Synoptic accident rates considering the ship's age
Further studies at the Ship Design Laboratory, National Technical University of Athens, on Suezmax tankers [8] and on very large crude carriers (VLCCs) and ultra-large crude carriers (ULCCs) [9] appear to demonstrate similar trends.
Non-accidental structural failures; accident rates by hull configuration and ship's age
The reason for attempting to account for the effect of age on Aframax accidents was that, when results from this project were presented on the first comparisons of the pollution index of single-and doublehull tankers, showing a far superior performance of the double-hull configuration, repeated comments that such a comparison is inequitable because of the very much younger age distribution of the doublehull tanker fleet compared with the single-hull fleet were received. The section above, containing the synoptic results, would suggest that the primary area of emphasis in the analysis of the effect of age should be the non-accidental structural failures. In this section the focus is therefore on examining how age affects the historic rates of non-accidental structural failure for each type of hull configuration. Figure 8 presents the non-accidental structural The analysis contained in Figs 8 to 10 indicates the rates, while it is still too early to attempt to draw any conclusions on the performance of middle-aged following.
double-hull tankers. 1. SH-non-SBT/PL ships (pre-MARPOL tankers) produced a particularly poor record. 3.7 Geography of oil spills caused by Aframax 2. SH-SBT/PL ships (MARPOL tankers) have a very tankers much better record than their predecessors. Figure 11 shows the worldwide geographic locations 3. The fleet of the double-hull tankers is probably (Marsden grid coding) of registered oil pollution still too young to allow any firm conclusions to caused by Aframax tankers over the studied period be made, although it could be said that the . Light-grey squares present a total appearance of the two non-zero values at the ages pollution quantity of less than 7 t over the studied of 1 and 2 years old could be a source of some period, grey squares present a total pollution quantity concern.
in the range of 7-700 t, and the black squares indicate a total quantity of greater than 700 t of oil spilt. Focusing on the non-accidental structural failures which occur to ships of age up to 5 years, it can
The most severely affected areas worldwide by Aframax tankers, (over 700 t oil spilt) are the east be stated that double-hull ships have lower but non-negligible rates. and central Mediterranean, Scapa Flow, UK, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, Pacific Coast of North Considering non-accidental structural failures which occur to ships of age between 11 and 15 years, America, Straits of Malacca, and southwestern Australia. SH-non-SBT/PL ships presented by far the highest 
CONCLUSIONS
POP&C fault trees and event trees with the necessary frequencies and consequences data. The populated fault trees and event trees would then be used to Accident databases such as that utilized by POP&C are potentially important tools for gauging the safety conduct the risk assessment of the Aframax fleet. As discussed earlier, the POP&C database was and the environmental performance of the industry. They can be used to guide the regulatory process so designed in a manner that helped the analysts to code, through drop-down menus and checklists, all that the regulations that are being produced may be focused so as to address the weakest links in the the key information that could be extracted from the narrative of each record of an incident of accident. safety and environmental prevention chain, and also they can be used to provide alerts for areas of design,
In effect the resultant codes, like stepping stones, aim to define the sequence of events in each accident. operation, and training which may be in need of additional attention or of a new approach.
The events leading up to the accident are part of the fault tree and define the frequency (probability) of Whereas the recognition of the potential value of marine accident databases is not new, the databases the accident, while the events after the accident belong to the event tree and define the consequences that currently exist suffer from two basic and serious weaknesses that greatly diminish the ability to utilize of the accident (consequence and its magnitude, on life, environment, and property). these data. These two problems were faced by the analysts of the POP&C project and, although they For all Aframax tankers, the accident rate per ship year has reduced significantly when considering could not be resolved within this project, the experience gained is certainly worthy of dissemination pre-1990 and post-1990 accidents (by a factor of about 3). However, the rate of accidents leading because, until these problems start being resolved, accident data will remain mostly underutilized.
to pollution per ship year has reduced by a less significant amount (by around 35 per cent). It might be argued that many maritime accident records already exist in the public domain in the From the various tanker hull design concepts currently operating, it appears that the double-hull form of commercially available casualty databases (examples are the old LMIS database, the Lloyd's and the SH-SBT/PL perform best in all accident categories in terms of spilled tonne rates. Register-Fairplay database, and the Lloyd's Marine Intelligence Unit database). Whereas these inter-
The correlation between a ship's age and the probability of suffering an accident is not straight-national databases contain a plethora of records of shipping casualties (and a plethora of records are forward; middle-aged ships appear to be more sensitive to non-accidental structural failures, com-certainly needed in order to arrive at statistically meaningful conclusions), they all tend to suffer greatly pared with older and younger ships. This is clearly so with single-hull ships and remains to be clarified from the fact that the source of their information is, more often than not, non-technical, and anyone who for the double-hull ships, currently too young in age to be conclusively assessed. has worked with such data will probably confirm this serious limitation.
The analysis of geographical locations of recorded accidents with high pollution showed that the east The second stumbling block to the utilization of accident data arises from the way that the Mediterranean, Gulf of Mexico, and Caribbean Sea were the most heavily polluted areas by Aframax oil information is categorized. Accidents are assigned a single category, such as collision, grounding, tanker accidents in the period 1978-2003. fire or explosion, hull and machinery, etc. This onedimensional categorization ignores the basic fact that accidents are sequences of undesirable events, ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS each of these having their own probability profile; e.g. a fire can lead to loss of power or steering, which A major part of the particular study presented herein was financially supported by the European Com-in turn can lead to grounding. Using a single code to define an accident takes away vital information mission under the Growth Programme of the Sixth Framework Programme. Support was given under for any subsequent analysis and in the days of computers is an unnecessary restriction. It should the Specific Targeted Research Project scheme, Contract FP6-PLT-506193. therefore be evident that accident categorization (accident taxonomy) is in need of a rethink and a
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The historical analysis of accidents presented in of any such knowledge, information, or data, or of the consequences thereof. this paper was performed in order to populate the on Learning from marine incidents, London, UK, 
